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Frivolous Filings and the Penalty of Sanctions: 
The Disparate Impact of Rule 11 Sanctions in 
the Litigation Process 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Attorneys are trained to represent 
their clients to the greatest extent of 
their abilities within the bounds of the 
law and legal ethics. Developments 
over the past several years, however, 
have caused courts to scrutinize more 
closely the conduct of attorneys and to 
distinguish zealous from "frivolous") 
legal representation. 
The number of lawsuits has in-
creased dramatically in the past twenty 
years.2 This increase in litigation, how-
ever, has not come without cost to all 
involved. Attorneys are finding it more 
difficult to maintain control over their 
practice, and courts are increasingly 
unable to manage their dockets. Con-
sequently, litigants are disheartened 
by the time and expense involved in 
resolving even the most rudimentary 
issues. 
Pleadings, motions, pretrial discov-
ery, and costly and lengthy litigation 
have inundated the bench and barto the 
point of calling into question whether 
the litigation process has grown be-
yond manageable bounds. The prob-
lem is aptly described by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit in Gullo v. HirsP: 
While we must be careful to 
assure that courts are always 
open to complaining parties, 
we have an equal obligation to 
see that its processes are not 
abused by harassing, or by 
recklessly invoking court ac-
tion in frivolous causes or by 
foot dragging and delaying in 
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order to deny or postpone the 
enforcement of unquestioned 
rights. Lawyers have an obli-
gation as officers of the court 
not to indulge in any of these 
practices. Vexatious litiga-
tion and the law's delays have 
brought the courts in low re-
pute in many instances, and 
when the responsibility can be 
fixed, remedial action should 
betaken. 
Members of the legal community 
have expressed concern about the 
present state of affairs in the litigation 
process. Unfortunately, their dissatis-
faction for the most part has been di-
rected at one another and not at the 
problem in toto. The plaintiffs' bar is 
criticized for bringing lawsuits with-
out sufficient factual or legal ground to 
support their claims. The defense bar, 
on the other hand, is criticized for 
burdening the litigation process by gen-
erating unnecessary pleadings and 
motions filed only to buy additional 
time for their clients, or to make law-
suits so expensive that they must be 
abandoned out of economic necessity. 
Ironically, the typical climax to this 
costly and burdensome litigation pro-
cess is a settlement reached on the 
courthouse steps. 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure was amended in 1983 
in an effort to increase lawyers' re-
sponsibility to their clients and to the 
courts when filing any pleading, mo-
tion, or other paper. Amended Rule 11 
provides that the attorney or party's 
signature on any court paper certifies 
that the signer 
has read the pleading, motion, 
or other paper; that to the best 
of the signer's knowledge, in-
formation, and belief formed 
after reasonable inquiry it is 
well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation.4 
In essence, Rule 11 requires "litigants 
to stop, think and investigate more 
carefully before serving and filing 
papers .... "5 
The Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules - the drafters ofthe 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 11 -- envisioned that 
amended Rule 11 would curtail the so-
called "litigation explosion"by requir-
ingthat courts impose sanctions when-
ever Rule 11 was violated. By requir-
ing imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, 
the Committee sought to limit judicial 
discretion in finding violations of the 
rule, which, in turn, would promote 
more consistent and predictable appli-
cation of the rule. Unfortunately, the 
ambiguities of amended Rule 11 have 
promoted rather than discouraged ju-
dicial discretion, and have added to the 
litigation explosion by generating thou-
sands of conflicting court opinions on 
the meaning and application of Rule 11 
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to particular conduct. 
This Article addresses the opera-
tion and some of the shortcomings of 
Rule 11 and discusses the disparate 
impact of Rule lIon the litigation 
process. This Article posits that Rule 
11 is applied against the plaintiffs' bar 
more frequently and has the incidental 
effect of deterring vigorous advocacy.6 
The objective reasonableness standard 
mandated by Rule 11 has discouraged 
uniformity in court decisions, and has 
created considerable uncertainty in the 
minds of attorneys who cannot predict 
whether their conduct is sanctionable. 
II. AMENDED RULE 11: AN 
OVERVIEW 
Amended Rule 11 requires the im-
position of "appropriate sanctions" 
when the rule is violated by the attor-
ney or party to the action. Rule 11 is 
therefore distinguishable from other 
laws which leave the penalty of sanc-
tion to the discretion of the court.7 
Even under Rule 11, however, judges 
retain considerable discretion in deter-
mining the appropriate sanction and 
against whom that sanction should be 
assessed, whetheritbe the attorney, the 
client, or both. 8 
Attorneys' fees are the most com-
mon sanction/ although such an award 
rarely represents the total fees incurred 
by the party requesting sanctions. 10 
Sanctions may also take the form of 
reimbursement for the reasonable ex-
penses incurred to deal with the frivo-
lous filing, II fines,12 the striking of 
unsigned pleadings,13 injunctions 
against bringing new or amended 
suits,14 or disciplinary action indepen-
dent of Rule ILlS 
Sanctions are sought in a variety of 
circumstances, the most frequent of 
which are in connection with 12(b)(6) 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim or Rule 56 motions for summary 
judgment, actions customarily initi-
ated by defendants. 16 Sanctions issues 
arise more frequently in complex liti-
gation involving alleged civil rights 
violations, employment discrimination, 
securities fraud, RICO violations and 
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tax disputes - cases which typically 
present difficult problems of factual 
proof for the plaintiff. 17 
Rule 11 does not establish the tim-
ingforimposingsanctions. Mostcourts 
agree, however, that sanctions should 
be imposed promptly after the offend-
ing conduct to maximize Rule 11 's 
deterrent effect on subsequent abuses. 18 
Sanctions for frivolous motions are 
typically assessed at the time of or 
soon after the motion is ruled on, 
whereas sanctions for frivolous plead-
ings are usually assessed after the liti-
gation has concluded. 19 
Sanctions are awarded pursuant to 
a motion filed by a party to the action 
or by the trial judge sua sponte. Rule 
11 sanctions have even been imposed 
by appellate courts for frivolous ap-
peals,20 although sanctions awards are 
more routinely reversed on appeaPI 
The circuit courts are split over the 
issue of whether Rule 11 imposes on 
counsel and the parties a "continuing 
duty" to reevaluate their case as the 
litigation progresses and to discon-
tinue the action if it becomes clear that 
a filing no longer has a factual or legal 
basis. This split of opinion exists 
despite the advisory nommittee notes 
to Rule 11 which caution that "[t ]he 
court is expected to avoid using the 
wisdom of hindsight and should test 
the signer's conduct by inquiring into 
what was reasonable to believe at the 
time . . . the paper was submitted. "22 
The majority of jurisdictions, in-
cludingthe Fourth Circuit, have heeded 
the advisory committee's recommen-
dation and hold that the signer's acts 
must be judged against the facts and 
law known at the time court papers are 
signed.23 Accordingly, if counsel at 
the time offiling believes a claim to be 
colorable, but later becomes aware that 
the claim is in fact frivolous, he will 
not be subject to Rule 11 sanctions for 
failing to discontinue the action.24 
These courts find that Rule 11 sanc-
tions cannot be based on thefailure to 
file or amend pleadings or other pa-
pers. This approach is consistent with 
the plain language of Rule 11 and the 
advisory committee notes.2S 
Other courts have held that the 
signer's duty is continuous, so that 
developments transpiring at any point 
during the course of litigation may 
make an originally legitimate filing 
frivolous and may justify imposing 
sanctions if the filing is not revised or 
discontinued.26 Even courts which find 
no continuing duty under Rule 11 hold 
that Rule 11 is violated when subse-
quent papers ratify or reassert frivo-
lous factual or legal allegations of the 
original filing. Thus, if the plaintiff 
discovers after the original filing that 
his claim is without legal or factual 
merit, his opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment or dismissal would 
violate Rule 11 because it is a new 
filing which tacitly reasserts the frivo-
lous factual or legal basis ofthe origi-
nal filing,21 
A. The Signer's Certification 
Under Rule 11 
A signature on any pleading, mo-
tion or other paper certifies that the 
signer (1) has conducted a reasonable 
inquiry into the facts and law support-
ing the filing, (2) has submitted a filing 
which embodies existing law or a good 
faith argument forthe extension, modi-
fication or reversal of existing law; and 
(3) has not interposed the filing for an 
improper purpose. If the court finds 
one or more ofthese requirements vio-
lated, it must impose an appropriate 
sanction under Rule 11. 
1. Reasonable Factual Inquiry 
Rule 11 does not specify the type of 
factual inquiry required priorto a filing 
other than to require that the inquiry be 
objectively reasonable. Under this stan-
dard, courts must ask whether a rea-
sonable attorney in like circumstances 
would believe his inquiry to be reason-
able. 
Rule 11 plays a significant role in 
deterring claims which are not grounded 
in fact. Before 1983, the liberal plead-
ing and motions rules did not deter 
groundless factual allegations, and, in 
fact, encouraged ambiguity and 
overgeneralized statements of claims.28 
These liberal pleading rules remain 
part of the Federal Rules, although 
their continued efficacy in the wake of 
amended Rule 11 is less than clear.29 
Insufficient factual inquiry takes 
many shapes. Use of boilerplate lan-
guage in a complaint or other pleading 
may be grounds for Rule 11 sanc-
tions.3D Blind reliance on the client's 
or co-counsel's representation of the 
facts supporting a complaint without 
independent investigation or reference 
to the case file may justify Rule 11 
sanctions where the allegations are later 
proved insufficient to sustain the ac-
tion. 31 Insufficient factual inquiry may 
even be found where the amount of 
damages sought in the complaint are 
wholly disproportionate to the injuries 
actually sustained by the plaintiff. 32 
Some courts refuse to impose sanc-
tions before discovery is complete.33 
The majority of jurisdictions, how-
ever, hold that the pleader cannot rely 
on pretrial discovery to cure a factually 
defective pleading in order to avoid 
Rule 11 sanctions.34 
Rule 11 discourages courts from 
considering post-filing developments 
when judging whether a paper is frivo-
lous, and encourages the courts to con-
sider circumstances such as time, 
prefiling preparation, and the attorney's 
ability to interview the client. Judges, 
however, may experience understand-
able difficulty considering the facts as 
they existed at the time of filing, espe-
cially when the motion for sanctions 
may not be decided until many months 
after the allegedly frivolous paper was 
submitted. Judicial opinion may en-
compass, not what the attorney should 
have known to be true ofthe facts at the 
time offiling, but whatthe judge knows 
ofthe facts at the time the request for 
sanctions is before him. 
Success on certain pretrial motions 
make the award of Rule 11 sanctions 
more likely. A party who prevails on 
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule 12(b)(6) is much more likely 
to request and receive sanctions.35 The 
standard for dismissal under Rule 
12(b)( 6) necessarily suggests why sanc-
tions are so frequently awarded in con-
nection with motions to dismiss. 
The Supreme Court in Conley v. 
Gibson36 established a very difficult 
standard fordismissal pursuantto Rule 
12(b)( 6). A defendant must prove "be-
yond doubt that the plaintiff can prove 
no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief."37 
This standard, if met by the defendant, 
suggests the extent to which the 
plaintiff's action is obviously deficient 
and thus may legitimate the defendant's 
request for sanctions. By the same 
token, a plaintiff who successfully de-
feats a motion to dismiss should be 
immune from Rule 11 sanctions if the 
filing is later alleged to be frivolous. 38 
The benchmark for imposing sanc-
tions should not be whether the party 
loses a motion or verdict, rather it 
should be whether the plaintiff had "a 
glimmer of a chance of prevailing."39 
Courts must adhere strictly to Rule 
11' s dictate that the filing be judged as 
ofthe filing date and not as of the date 
the motion for sanctions is before the 
COurt.4D 
2. Reasonable Legal Inquiry 
The reasonable legal inquiry re-
quirement of Rule 11 establishes a 
two-fold duty on the part of the attor-
ney. First, the attorney must conduct a 
diligent prefiling inquiry into the law 
of the applicable jurisdiction. Second, 
he must not submit a pleading or other 
paper which takes an unreasonable le-
gal position "in light of existing law or 
a good faith extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law .... " Ac-
cording to this standard, the pleader 
must assert an objectively reasonable 
argument in support of what the law is 
or should be to avoid Rule 11 sanc-
tions. 
The reasonableness ofthe attorney's 
legal inquiry may depend on a number 
of factors. These factors include the 
time available for legal research,41 the 
existence of conflicting legal opinion, 
the difficulty of the legal issue, or the 
complexity ofthe case itself. 
Rule 11 is violated where the attor-
ney fails to undertake legal research 
which would have revealed the exist-
ence of primary authority directly con-
trary to the legal position taken in the 
paper.42 Likewise, a filing is not well 
grounded in law where it interposes a 
legal position which is directly con-
trary to settled precedent in the rel-
evant circuit, even if it is supported by 
law in another circuit. 43 The same is 
true for causes of action which are 
initiated well after the applicable stat-
ute of limitations has run,44 or which 
are plainly barred by the doctrines of 
res judicata or collateral estoppe1.45 A 
filing is not well grounded in law if it 
fails to confront or mischaracterizes 
adverse authority to its argument for 
the modification or extension of exist-
ing law.46 
Courts generally refuse to award 
sanctions where the paper raises a ques-
tion of first impression.47 Likewise, 
courts will refuse to award sanctions 
where a filing takes a legal position 
directly contrary to district court au-
thority in a jurisdiction where only 
appellate decisions are considered con-
trolling precedent. 48 
The advisory committee notes warn 
that Rule 11 should not be applied in 
such a way as to chill an attorney's 
enthusiasm or creativity.49 However, 
it is easy to envision how Rule 11 
could have such an effect on zealous 
advocacy. 
Neither Rule 11 nor case precedent 
provide much guidance for attorneys 
who attempt to challenge existing law. 
In fact, several important questions 
remain unanswered. For example, 
which jurisdiction's law must an attor-
ney and the court consider when deter-
mining the plausibility of a particular 
claim? Is it enough for the plaintiff to 
rely for his legal argument on a case 
decided by the California Supreme 
Court, or must he refer solely to the law 
in his own jurisdiction before filing?5D 
One would expect that a party seeking 
to reverse existing law would be justi-
fied in relying on extra jurisdictional 
law for support. The real question in 
22.3/fhe Law Forum - 5 
light of the case law interpreting Rule 
11 is whether a party would ever be 
justified in seeking a reversal of exist-
ing law. 
Along the same line, it is unclear 
whether the reasonable legal inquiry 
standard is national in scope (similar to 
the standard applied when judging a 
physician's standard of care), or 
whether a local standard applies. One 
distinguished commentator suggests 
that attorneys should be held to a stan-
dard similar to that which is applied to 
physicians holding themselves out as 
experts, where the reasonableness of 
the inquiry into existing law will de-
pend on the attorney's field of exper-
tise, available research facilities, and 
his economic resources. SI 
Although Rule 11 requires that the 
court apply an objective reasonable-
ness standard for determining whether 
a filing, or an argument for a modifica-
tion or reasonable extension ofthe law, 
is improper in light of existing law, 
judges have sufficient latitude in de-
ciding whether any reasonable attor-
ney would have expected that the law 
was ripe for change. 
There can be little doubt that the 
nature of the court and the philoso-
phies of the judge may well dictate 
whether a legal claim is frivolous or 
acceptable. S2 A strict constructionist, 
for example, may be unwilling to dis-
turb settled precedent and may con-
clude that any attempt to disturb exist-
ing law is sanctionable. A judge who 
is a judicial expansionist, however, 
may well find arguments advocating 
deviation from settled precedent ac-
ceptable and possibly desirable. Not 
only will such a judge be more likely to 
deny a motion to dismiss the action, 
but he may be more inclined to deny a 
request by opposing counsel for sanc-
tions. 
It is difficult to determine the extent 
to which Rule 11 affects advocacy, 
particularly because the reported cases 
reflect only those claims which pro-
ceeded to trial and not those claims 
which were never initiated or were 
initiated and abandoned.s3 
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Although careful scrutiny is en-
couraged and intended by Rule 11, 
there is an increased risk that legiti-
mate cases will be refused by those 
attorneys who are risk adverse. Rule 
11 may deter lawyers from taking cases 
and pursuing needed changes in the 
common law. The attorney is faced 
with the rule and its uncertainties when 
deciding whether to take a case. He 
may scrutinize the plaintiff and his 
case more closely, and may refuse a 
case which, in his legal opinion, is 
barely colorable. The lawyer is re-
quired, in essence, to pre-judge the 
factual and legal bases of a client's 
case. 
A lawyer should not be forced to 
make decisions which may preclude 
the plaintiff with a colorable claim 
from ever seeking legal redress. It is 
ultimately the client who suffers as a 
result of an attorney's walk along Rule 
11 's legal tightrope. Clearly, the draft-
ers ofRule 11 did not intend forthe rule 
to chill zealous advocacy, although the 
rule's ambiguities necessarily produce 
such a result. S4 
Rule 11 adds strength to the doc-
trine of stare decisis by imposing on 
lawyers an obligation to avoid disturb-
ing settled precedent. The law must 
accommodate everchanging societal 
needs and expectations. History indi-
cates that courts have overturned settled 
common law without the slightest fore-
warning or academic explanation. ss As 
one commentator has noted, "[t ]oday's 
frivolity may be tomorrow's law."S6 
Similarly, what the trial court may find 
an implausible legal argument and thus 
sanctionable, an appellate court may 
find acceptable. S7 
Rule 11 places a barrier in front of 
the innovative or persistent lawyer who 
seeks to challenge settled precedent by 
affording the judiciary unfettered dis-
cretion to determine under which legal 
theory (if any) a reasonable attorney 
should seek recompense for his client. 
3. Papers Filed for an Improper 
Purpose 
Rule 11 defines the term "improper 
purpose" to include actions which are 
intended ''to harass or to cause unnec-
essary delay or needless increase in the 
cost of Iitigation."s8 Any paper filed 
for a purpose other than to vindicate 
the rights of a party in court is deemed 
to have been filed for an improper 
purpose.S9 A party challenging a par-
ticular motion or pleading need not 
show bad faith on the part ofthe filer, 
although proof of bad faith practically 
guarantees success on a motion for 
sanctions. An improper purpose may 
also be found where an attorney files a 
pleading which, if challenged, he has 
no intention of defending. 60 
The overlap between an improper 
purpose for filing a paper and one 
which is unreasonable in light of exist-
ing law is apparent where an attorney 
persists in asserting a claim or defense 
untenable by existing law.61 Similarly, 
claims brought without factual foun-
dation or with numerous factual inac-
curacies which could have been avoided 
through cursory investigation may be 
interpreted as being brought for an 
improper purpose.62 
Amended Rule 11 requires that 
courts assess the underlying purpose 
of the filing under an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness.63 Unlike the 
standards of Rule 11 prior to its 1983 
amendment, subjective bad faith ofthe 
filer need not be shown, although such 
a showing increases the likelihood that 
sanctions will be awarded.64 
Many courts find the objective stan-
dard for evaluating the purpose of the 
filing unworkable, and consider in-
stead the "motive ofthe signer in pur-
suing the suit.'>6S Other courts embrace 
the objective standard and consider the 
circumstances of the case, the court's 
own experience in the litigation pro-
cess, and the law and rules ofthe bar in 
determining whether the paper was 
filed for an improper purpose.66 
An inquiry into the subjective in-
tent of the filer appears the better ap-
proach for detennining the purpose 
underlying the filing. Such a subjec-
tive inquiry protects the filer from judi-
cial second-guessing over the reason 
for the filing, and discourages courts 
from considering matters such as in-
creased cost and delay as a basis for 
finding an improper purpose, matters 
which are difficult to anticipate when 
the paper is filed. 67 
III. DISPARATE IMPOSITION 
OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
Numerous cases have discussed the 
obligation of plaintiffs to inquire into 
the factual and legal bases underlying 
a claim before bringing suit. Only a 
handful of cases, however, have ad-
dressed the defendant's obligation to 
make reasonable inquiry before an-
swering a complaint or filing other 
papers.68 
Statistics compiled since Rule 11 
was amended in 1983 suggest that 
plaintiffs are subjected to Rule 11 sanc,. 
tions more frequently than are defen-
dants.69 One study, for example, indi-
cates that 
[i]n the 57.8% of the cases in 
which a Rule 11 violation is 
found, the plaintiff is the vio-
lator in 46.9% of the cases, 
while the defendant is the vio-
latorinonly 1O.9%ofthecases. 
This great difference, however, 
is exp lained by the fact that the 
plaintiff is the target of the 
sanctions motion in 536 ofthe 
680 cases (78.8%) in which 
sanctions were requested. 70 
Defense attorneys do not face the 
same pressures in defending suits as do 
plaintiffs' attorneys in initiating them, 
and accordingly, their conduct is not as 
susceptible to Rule 11 inquiry. Of 
course, some of the pressures which 
plaintiffs' counsel experience "come 
with the turf." The plaintiff and his 
attorney have to contend with the stat-
ute of limitations. The plaintiff also 
carries the affinnative burden of pro v-
ing the elements of his case. Plaintiff 
also may be less inclined to make a 
motion for sanctions since the addi-
tionallitigationmaytake on a life of its 
own, thus reducing the amount of a 
prospective judgment by the additional 
costs of litigating the Rule 11 issue. 
Likewise, the scarcity of judicial opin-
ion on the propriety of Rule 11 sanc-
tions for defendants' conduct may lead 
plaintiffs' counsel to consider any re-
quest for sanctions futile. 
Notwithstanding the plaintiffs in-
creased susceptibility to Rule 11 sanc-
tions, more attention should be given 
to the conduct of defendants and de-
fense counsel. Equal application of 
Rule 11 against defendants will en-
courage prompt case settlement, since 
the defendant will be forced to con-
front weaknesses of their cases much 
sooner.71 As one commentator sug-
gests, "[i]f plaintiffs begin to chal-
lenge the factual and legal adequacy of 
defendants' pleadings under rule 11, 
the use of sanctions will profoundly 
affect the 'game' oflitigation.'>72 
IV. RULE 8 AND RULE 11: 
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
LIBERAL PLEADING AND 
REASONABLE INQUIRY 
Rule 8 ofthe Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure pennits alternative plead-
ing and allows the plaintiff to assert 
legal theories of recovery which are 
contradictory to one another. Rule 8 
penn its such pleading as a matter of 
equity, so that if there is any conceiv-
able theory of recovery, the plaintiff 
has the option of invoking the theory. 
The language of Rule 8(e)(2) exempli-
fies the liberal pleading regime of the 
Federal Rules: 
A party may set forth two or 
more statements of a claim or 
defense alternatively or hypo-
thetically, either in one count 
or defense orin separate counts 
or defenses. When two or 
more statements are made in 
the alternative and one ofthem 
if made independently would 
be sufficient, the pleading is 
not made insufficient by the 
insufficiency of one or more of 
the alternative statements. A 
party may also state as many 
separate claims or defenses as 
the party has regardless of con-
sistency and whether based on 
legal, equitable, or maritime 
grounds. All statements shall 
be made subject to the obliga-
tions set forth in Rule 11.73 
The standards for filing imposed by 
Rule 11 appear at odds with the notice 
pleading concept authorized by Rule 8 
even though the drafters of Rule 8 
attempted to make its standards har-
monious with Rule 11 'So 
The complexity of modem litiga-
tion requires that plaintiffs be penn it-
ted to assert alternate or inconsistent 
pleadings as pennitted by Rule 8.74 
Rule 8 requires that pleadings provide 
a general summary of the case which 
gives fairnoticeto the opposing party. 7S 
Rule 8 does not require that a pleading 
state "facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action."76 Rule 11, however, 
requires lawyers to articulate their le-
gal and factual bases more fully and 
much sooner than required by Rule 8.77 
The specificity in pleadings required 
by Rule 11 is inconsistent with the 
concept that claims should be made by 
short plain statements for relief. 78 
Rule 11 's requirement that claims 
be warranted by existing law is almost 
identical to the code pleading rules 
eliminated by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, where the pleader was 
required to state his claim in tenns of 
established "causes ofaction.»19 Rule 
11 's requirements that a filing have a 
sufficient factual and legal basis ren-
ders meaningless the liberal pleading 
allowances of Rule 8. 
V. THE FUTURE OF AMENDED 
RULE 11 
In August 1991, in response to nu-
merous criticisms of current Rule 11, 
the Advisory Committee on the Civil 
Rules published a Proposed Draft of 
Rule 11 which seeks to remedy many 
of the Rule's infinnities. Upon Su-
preme Court recommendation and con-
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gressional approval, the Proposed Draft 
shall take effect on December 1, 1993. 
Many ofthe changes to Rule 11 are 
contained in proposed Rule II(b), 
which reads: 
(b) Representations to Court. 
By presenting to the court 
(whether by signing, filing, 
submitting, or later advocat-
ing) a pleading, written mo-
tion, or other paper filed with 
or submitted to the court, an 
attorney or unrepresented 
party is certifying that to the 
best of the person's knowl-
edge, information, and belief 
formed after an inquiry rea-
sonable under the circum-
stances,--
(1) it is not being pre-
sented for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass 
or to cause unnecessary de-
lay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, 
and other legal contentions 
therein are warranted by 
existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for 
the extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law 
or the establishment of new 
law; 
(3) the allegations and 
other factual contentions 
have evidentiary support 
or, if specifically so identi-
fied, are likely to have 
evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for 
further investigation or dis-
covery; and 
(4) the denials of fac-
tual contentions are war-
ranted on the evidence or, 
ifspecifically so identified, 
are reasonably based on a 
lack of information or be-
lie/80 
The language of subsection (b) and 
other subsections ofthe Proposed Draft 
evidences several major changes to 
current Rule 11. 
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A. Continuing Duty 
The triggering event for a Rule 11 
violation under the Proposed Draft is 
the ''presenting or maintaining" of a 
filing. The advisory committee's notes 
explain that the Proposed Draft im-
poses a continuing duty on lawyers and 
litigants to reevaluate their factual and 
legal positions after the paper is sub-
mitted, and to discontinue actions 
which no longer have merit. Proposed 
Rule 11 therefore abandons the "snap-
shot" rule, pursuant to which the paper 
is judged as of the date it is signed and 
filed. 81 
The continuing duty rule embodied 
in the Proposed Draft encourages courts 
to use "hindsight and wisdom" when 
judging a paper's legitimacy, an ap-
proach which the advisory committee 
notes to current Rule 11 expressly cau-
tioned against. 82 The continuing duty 
rule would also allow opposing coun-
sel to assert Rule 11 violations through-
out the case, and would require liti-
gants to closely track the factual and 
legal developments of their cases.83 
This will further complicate the litiga-
tion process and will impede parties 
from developing the merits of their 
positions.84 The continuing duty rule 
also unfairly favors wealthy litigants 
who can afford to pay for their 
attorney's constant monitoring. Plain-
tiffs and their attorneys may be unable 
to satisfy the stringent burden imposed 
by the continuing duty rule, and may 
avoid bringing meritorious lawsuits 
for this reason.85 
B. Safe Harbor 
In response to criticisms that Rule 
11 tends to chill zealous advocacy, the 
advisory committee included several 
"safe harbor" provisions within sub-
section (c) ofthe Proposed Draft. One 
safe harbor requires a party alleging a 
violation of Rule 11 to give the offend-
ing party notice by separate motion of 
the "specific conduct alleged to vio-
late" the rule.86 Likewise, a motion for 
sanctions cannot not be filed with the 
court ''unless the challenged claim, 
defense, request, demand, objection, 
contention, or argument is not with-
drawn or corrected within 21 days (or 
other such time as the court may pre-
scribe) after service of the motion. "81 
This 21 day window affords parties 
time to withdraw their filings to avoid 
the risk of Rule 11 sanctions. This safe 
harbor appears to reject the Supreme 
Court's decision in Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 88 where the Court 
held that the district courts may im-
pose Rule 11 sanctions even when a 
case is voluntarily dismissed pursuant 
to Rule 41(a)(I)(i).89 
Subsection (c)(l)(B) of the Pro-
posed Draft establishes another safe 
harbor. It prohibits courts from impos-
ing Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte after 
a case has been settled or voluntarily 
dismissed, unless it enters an order 
"describing the specific conduct which 
appears to violate subdivision (b) and 
directing an attorney, law firm, orparty 
to show cause why it has not violated 
subdivision (b) with respectthereto.'>90 
The safe harbor provisions of the 
Proposed Draft are perhaps the most 
beneficial change to current Rule 11 
because they discourage use ofRule 11 
as a tactical device to discourage the 
filing or maintenance of legitimate 
claims. They also provide parties with 
the opportunity to withdraw a frivo-
lous filing in time to avoid Rule 11 
sanctions. 
C. Signer's Certification 
Respecting the Facts 
The Proposed Draft seeks to equal-
ize the disparate impact of Rule lIon 
plaintiffs by changing the certification 
with respect to facts. Rather than re-
quiring that the filer certify that his 
paper is well grounded in fact, the 
Proposed Draft requires that the paper's 
"allegations and other factual conten-
tions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, are likely to 
have evidentiary support after a rea-
sonable opportunity for further inves-
tigation or discovery. '>91 This is a more 
forgiving standard for plaintiffs who, 
for legitimate reasons, may not pos-
sess sufficient facts at the time of fil-
ing. 
The Proposed Draft appears to re-
ject the position of some courts that a 
party cannot use discovery to cure a 
defective pleading.92 Disputes over 
whether discovery will bear out facts 
sufficient to support the filing will 
likely generate considerable Rule 11 
litigation if the Proposed Draft be-
comes law.93 
D. Signer's Certification 
Respecting the Law 
The signer's certification with re-
spect to the law remains essentially the 
same under the Proposed Draft as un-
der current Rule 11. The signer must 
undertake a reasonable prefiling in-
quiry into the law to ensure that the 
position asserted by the paper is "war-
ranted by existing law." Proposed 
Rule 11, however, requires that the 
signer further certify that the paper is 
"warranted by existing law or a 
nonfrivolous argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of exist-
ing law or the establishment of new 
law."94 
The difference between Proposed 
Rule 11 and current Rule 11 is the use 
ofthe term "nonfrivolous" rather than 
"good faith." This difference in termi-
nology, which appears purely seman-
tic, does not clarify the attorney's or 
party's duty not to initiate or maintain 
causes which are without legal merit. 
In fact, by using the term 
"nonfrivolous," attorneys may be more 
inclined to refer to the universe of 
reported Rule 11 decisions and under-
take more exhaustive research to deter-
mine whether a particular legal posi-
tion has merit. The "nonfrivolous" 
standard may require more prefiling 
deliberation by the attorney than is 
justified. 
E. Imposition of Sanctions 
is Discretionary 
Another significant change reflected 
in the Proposed Draft is new subsec-
tion (c), which eliminates the require-
ment that an appropriate sanction be 
imposed by the court upon a violation 
ofthe Rule. The Proposed Draft leaves 
the decision to impose an "appropriate 
sanction" to the discretion of the 
court.9S This change allows courts 
needed flexibility in evaluating the 
particular situation of the filer before 
determining whether sanctions are ap-
propriate. 
F Relationship Between 
Rule 11 and Rule 56 
The advisory committee recognized 
the frequency with which Rule 11 sanc-
tions are imposed against parties who 
are defeated on Rule 56 motions for 
summary judgment. To remedy this, 
the advisory committee notes to the 
Proposed Draft state: "[t ]hat summary 
judgment is rendered against a party 
does not necessarily mean, for pur-
poses of this certification, that it had no 
evidentiary support for its position.'>96 
The committee notes go on to state, 
however, that "if a party has sufficient 
evidence with respect to a contention 
that would suffice to defeat a motion 
for summary judgment based thereon, 
it would have had sufficient' evidentiary 
support' for purposes of Rule 11.'>97 
There is some inconsistency with this 
approach which presumes the legiti-
macy of a pleading which survives a 
motion for summary judgment, but 
which cautions against presuming the 
existence of a Rule 11 violation when 
the pleading is defeated on summary 
judgment.98 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 
have given rise to more questions and 
inconsistent judicial opinion than the 
drafters likely expected. Although the 
rule may have reduced the number of 
frivolous claims initiated or maintained 
in the courts, it also may be deterring 
lawyers and clients from bringing ar-
guably legitimate claims and making 
plausible legal arguments for the ex-
tension or reversal of existing prece-
dent. 
The Proposed Draft attempts to rem-
edy many of Rule 11 's infirmities by 
recognizing the unique position of 
plaintiffs in the litigation process which 
makes them more susceptible to Rule 
11 scrutiny. Only time will tell whether 
the proposed amendments to Rule 11 
will ameliorate the problems plaguing 
Rule 11 in its present form. 
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